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Abstract
 The 1990s were characterized by substantial increases in the performance of and investor
reliance on financial analysts. Because managers possess superior private information and issue forecasts
to align investors’ expectations with their own, we predict that managers increased the quality of their
earnings forecasts during the 1990s in order to keep pace with the improved forward-looking information
provided by financial analysts, upon which investors increasingly relied. 
Using a sample of 2,437 management earnings forecasts, we document an increase in
management earnings forecast precision, management earnings forecast accuracy, and managers’
tendency to explain earnings forecasts in 1993-1996 relative to 1983-1986.  Given that these forecast
characteristics are linked to greater informativeness and credibility, we also document that the
information content of management earnings forecasts, as measured by the strength of share price
responses to forecast news, increased in 1993 -1996 relative to 1983-1986.  As expected, the increased
information content of management forecasts  primarily occurred for firms covered by financial analysts.
Keywords Management forecasts; Information environment; Earnings quality
JEL Descriptors M40, M41, M49
11. Introduction
The decade of the 1990's witnessed substantial changes in the capital markets information
environment, including a substantial increase in the percentage of shares held by institutional investors
(Gompers and Metrick 2001), broader financial analyst following (Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and
Trueman 2001), greater focus on the firms’ ability to generate earnings that “meet or beat” expectations
(Brown and Caylor 2005), increases in the accuracy and precision of financial analysts forecasts (Brown
and Caylor 2005), and the widely held popular belief that earnings had “lost relevance” for equity
security valuation.  With respect to this latter change in information environment, studies using data
extending into the mid-1990s find an intertemporal decline in the value relevance of earnings (e.g., Lev
and Zarowin 1999; Francis and Schipper 1999), an intertemporal increase in the value relevance of
quarterly earnings announcements (e.g., Landsman and Maydew 2002), and an increase in the
information content of analyst reports through time (Francis, Schipper, and Vincent 2002a).  
To date, however, evidence on intertemporal change in the quality of unaudited voluntary
earnings disclosures by management is lacking.  Such evidence is important given that a growing body of
literature seeks to understand broad cross-sectional averages of intertemporal changes in mandated
disclosure relevance conditional on voluntary preemptive and supplemental disclosures provided by
management (e.g., Francis, Schipper, and Vincent 2002b; Lundholm and Meyers 2002; Gelb and
Zarowin 2002).  
To provide evidence on changes in the quality of unaudited voluntary disclosures over time, we
compare cross-sectional average management earnings forecast characteristics in one four-year period
beginning in 1993 and ending in 1996 to management earnings forecast characteristics occurring in a
comparison period 10 years earlier (1983-1986).  According to Brown and Caylor (2005), 1993 marks the
beginning of a period in which the capital markets increased penalties for failure to meet or beat financial
analysts expectations, indicating investors’ increased reliance on the forward-looking information
2The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act was passed in December 1995. The effectiveness of the Act1
in changing expected and management forecast behavior is not clear, at least for 1996.  As noted by Baginski,
Hassell, and Kimbrough (2002), several analyses indicate that, at least initially, the protections of the Act could be
avoided by shifting the jurisdiction of the suit, and the evidence on the effectiveness of the Act is mixed.  We leave
1996 forecasts in our sample to match the number of years in 1983-1986.  However, we replicated all tests in this
paper (not tabulated) with 1996 observations discarded.  Our conclusions are identical.
 For example, Lev and Zarowin (1999) document a decline in earnings relevance over a period ending in2
1996.  Francis and Schipper (1999) document a decline in earnings relevance over a period ending in 1994. 
Landsman and Maydew (2002) find an intertemporal increase in the value relevance of quarterly earnings
announcements over a period ending in 1998.  Francis et al. (2002a) document increases in the information content
of analyst reports with a sample spanning 1986-1995.  These studies form the basis for current thinking in the area.
provided by financial analysts.  The end of our sample period, 1996, represents the last year in which
legal liability rules were effectively similar in the 1990s.   The 1993-1996 period is also a common1
“recent period” in the most recent studies that examine increased relevance of earnings releases and
financial analyst reports, and thus represents an appropriate comparison sample to the prior work which
dominates current thinking.2
Given the dramatic change in the macro information environment in the 1990s, driven by greater
institutional investor demand for forward-looking information and satisfied by more precise, accurate,
and influential analysts reports, we expect that, in the 1990s, managers would have responded to the
higher information quality hurdle if they wished to align investor expectations with their own. 
Accordingly, we expect that managers released management forecasts during the 1990s that possessed
characteristics indicative of higher quality – increased precision, increased accuracy, and increased
explanation. 
Using a sample of 2,437 management earnings forecasts, we document an increase in
management forecast precision, forecast accuracy, and the tendency to explain forecasts with external
attributions in 1993-1996 relative to 1983-1986.  Given that these forecast characteristics are linked to
increased information content, we also document that the information content of management forecasts
3 Also, using a similar sample size to tests that reject the null of equal occurrence of external attributions,3
we fail to reject the null of equal occurrence of  internal attributions across periods.  Because Baginski, Hassell, and
Kimbrough (2004) document pricing effects of external but not internal attributions, this result is also consistent with
the idea that changes occur in the set of management forecast characteristics that are linked to higher quality
forecasts.
increased during the period, and that the increases occur only for firms covered by financial analysts, as
expected.3
In contrast to prior work that documents cross-sectional differences in management response to
firm-specific disclosure incentives, our results indicate that cross-sectional average management earnings
forecast characteristics (precision, accuracy, explanation, and resulting information content) are sensitive
to structural changes in market-level information environment, consistent with the expectations
adjustment hypothesis (Ajinkya and Gift 1984; King, Pownall, and Waymire 1990).  Changes in macro-
level information environment are economy-wide antecedents to management forecasting behavior, and
thus, our work complements work on other economy-wide antecedents to management forecasting
behavior, such as legal environment (Skinner 1999; Baginski et al. 2002).
Our results also pertain to the information environment in which earnings releases are priced. 
The increases in management earnings forecast relevance over time that we document, the increases in
the information content of financial analyst reports over a similar time period documented by Francis,
Schipper, and Vincent (2002a), and the increases in the information content of earnings releases
documented by Landsman and Maydew (2002) call into question why so many studies document a
decrease in earnings relevance.  In other words, if reports that preempt earnings releases (i.e., analyst and
management reports) are increasingly valuable to the market, and the subsequent reports of earnings are
increasingly valuable to the market, why do long-window association studies report that earnings
relevance has declined? 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In section II, we present the basis for our
conjecture that management earnings forecast quality changed during the 1990s. In section III, we
4describe the management earnings forecast sample.  In section IV, we present results and robustness
checks, and Section V concludes the paper.
2. Basis for expecting change in management forecast quality
Managers have incentives to issue credible forecasts to align investor expectations with their own
(Ajinkya and Gift 1984; King et al. 1990).  These incentives are sufficiently strong such that, although
management earnings forecasts are voluntary and unaudited, management earnings forecasts move
security prices (Patell 1976; Waymire 1984) and are viewed by the security market as at least as relevant
to equity security pricing as actual earnings releases (Pownall and Waymire 1989).  
The decade of the 1990's witnessed substantial changes in the capital markets information
environment.  Gompers and Metrick (2001) report a substantial increase in the percentage of shares held
by institutional investors between 1980 and 1996, with large institutional investors doubling their
ownership percentages.  Ajinkya et al. (2005) argue that institutional investors demand greater disclosure
of forward-looking information.  Not surprisingly, financial analysts, the primary provider of earnings
forecasts, have responded.  Brown and Caylor (2005) note that post-1992 market conditions reflect
“increased media coverage given to analyst forecasts, more analyst following, more firms covered by
analysts, and temporal increases in both the accuracy and precision of financial analysts forecasts.” 
Francis et al. (2002a) also document an increase in the information content of analyst reports between
1986 and 1995.  
Given more precise, accurate, and influential analysts reports in the 1990s, managers face a
higher information quality hurdle if they wish to align investor expectations with their own. 
Accordingly, we expect managers to release 1990s management earnings forecasts that possess
characteristics indicative of higher quality – increased precision, increased accuracy, and increased
explanation.  Each characteristic has been linked by prior research to enhanced information content (Kim
5and Verrecchia 1991; Baginski et al. 1993, 2004; Williams 1996), and accordingly, we examine whether
price reactions to 1990s management earnings forecasts are enhanced (relative to 1980s forecasts)
because of their higher quality. To the extent that analyst coverage proxies for the change in market
information environment, we do not expect to find this effect for firms not covered by financial analysts. 
Our conjecture is at a macro-level.  We expect the set of publicly-released management earnings
forecasts to be of a higher quality in the 1990s.  This condition will exist if a given set of firms increases
forecast quality over time or if the set of firms that issues management forecasts in the 1990s issues
higher quality forecasts than the (possibly different) set of firms that issued management forecasts in the
1980s.  We do not attempt to distinguish between these two alternatives because they are predicated on
firm-specific changes in the incentives to issue management forecasts.  We focus instead on macro-level
changes in the information environment during a period of time in which macro-level legal environment
does not change, and we conjecture that the average effect of the macro-level change in information
environment will be to create an average increase in management earnings forecast quality for the firms
that issue such forecasts.
Several potential counterbalancing conditions exist which increase the tension in testing our
conjecture that management earnings forecast quality increased in the 1990s. First, Matsumoto (2002)
and Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki (2004) examine the behavior of financial analyst forecast revisions
during a reporting period as a proxy for management guidance, observing patterns of forecast revisions
that suggest that analysts are “walked down” to earnings expectations that can be met or beaten.  In fact,
Richardson et al. (2004) find strong support for their walk down claim post 1992. Cotter, Tuna, and
Wysocki (2003) examine public management guidance (post 1993) and find evidence that managers are
successful in walking down analyst earnings expectations prior to the release of actual earnings to an
expectation equal to or less than actual quarterly earnings.  In the context of this expectations
management “game,” one could argue that managers might have an incentive to create a downward bias
6 Our DJNRS search keywords are:  “expects earnings,” “expects net,” “expects income,” “expects losses,”4
“expects profits,” “expects results,” and three similar lists with first words “forecasts”, “predicts”, and “sees”.  To be
classified as a management forecast, the article had to describe an expectation about future earnings.  If the language
was past tense or present tense, the article was not coded as a forecast. The forecast also had to be attributed to a
company official or to the firm. The number of forecasts discarded at each step of our sample selection process and
the reason the forecast did not make the final sample can be found in Baginski et al. (1993, 2004).
in analysts’ expectations to ensure a later positive good news actual earnings announcement, thus
compromising management forecast quality.  Second, the incentives that enhance the role of management
forecasts in adjusting earnings expectations also create the potential for managers to use an alternative
route to meet or beat analyst forecasts; e.g., opportunistic management of the actual earning number
through aggressive (or even fraudulent) accrual practices.  If such practices have led to a 1990s decline in
the relevance of earnings, per se, then management earnings forecast relevance may have likewise
declined. Collins, Maydew, and Weiss (1997), Lev and Zarowin (1999), and Francis and Schipper (1999)
provide empirical evidence of declining earnings relevance.  Finally, if financial analyst forecast quality
has increased at a greater rate through time relative to management earnings forecast quality, then the
precision of prior expectations might be greater than the precision of the management forecast signal in
the 1990s, and the ability of the managers information to move expectations would decrease in the 1990s
(Kim and Verrecchia 1991).
3. Sample and variable measurement
We combined two existing management earnings forecast samples of both interim and annual
results from the Dow Jones News Retrieval Service (DJNRS) for 1983-1986 and 1993-1996.   As noted4
by Hirst, Koonce, and Venkataraman (2006), 1980-1995 represents a period of legal environment
stability.  Our sample ends one year after this stable period ends (through the year following passage of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in December of 1995).  The four years of data matches the
1983-1986 period length, which we chose as our benchmark period because we had access to the hand-
7 Machine readable data bases from which management earnings forecasts can be drawn do not exist before5
1993.  Construction of large samples of 1980s forecasts is a labor-intensive process, especially when multiple
qualitative dimensions of the forecasts such as attributions and other forecast language must be quantified.  As a
result, few studies using hand-gathered management earnings forecasts exist relative to the substantial number of
studies which re-use machine-readable, existing samples coded on the COMPUSTAT and CRSP tapes.  Our decision
to use existing samples from 1983-1986 and 1993-1996 minimizes data collection costs.  Further, it maximizes
power if the change in information environment was gradual over the 1983-1996 period.  We are unable to document
what occurred in 1987-1992, however, which represents a potential limitation of our study.
  The downturn in sample size appears temporary as it does not persist into 1997 and 1998 if we use the6
same sampling procedure.  Smaller numbers of forecasts in the early 1990's might have stimulated the PSLRA
legislation, the goal of which was to increase public disclosure.  Anilowski, Feng, and Skinner (2004) also report a
substantial increase in management forecasts from the First Call database in 1997 and 1998 relative to 1995 and
1996.
gathered and coded management forecast data.   We discarded qualitative (i.e., “general impression”)5
forecasts, forecasts for which we were unable to obtain sufficient data on COMPUSTAT and CRSP,
forecasts made more than one period ahead, and forecasts made after period end.  Our final sample
consists of 2,437 forecasts, 1,486 from the early period and 951 from the later period.6
5. Results
Differences in ex ante management earnings forecasts characteristics: Precision and attribution
Initially, we examine changes in two management earnings forecast characteristics that should
lead to greater influence on investors’ expectations.  More precise earnings forecasts should lead to
greater revisions in investors’ expectations (Baginski et al. 1993; Kim and Verrecchia 1991).  Also,
earnings forecasts issued with external attributions are associated with a higher response coefficient on
unexpected earnings conveyed in a management forecast (Baginski et al. 2004). 
Tables 1 presents univariate tests of the difference in management earnings forecast precision
and tendency to issue an external attribution in the 1990s relative to the 1980s.  PRECISE equals two for
the most precise point forecasts, one for range forecasts, and zero for open-interval minimum and
maximum type forecasts.  Consistent with our conjecture that managers increased forecast quality during
the 1990s (e.g., increased forecast precision), a significant difference exists (p < 0.0001) between the
8distribution of forecast forms in the two periods.  In 1993-1996, a smaller percentage of the less precise
maximum and minimum type forecasts are issued, and a higher percentage of the more precise point and
range forecasts are issued. 
Each forecast is also coded to reflect whether managers attributed forecasted performance to an
external factor (EXTERNAL) such as competition and certain economic factors. Examples of external
factors include change in market for product, general loss or gain of customers, weather catastrophe,
order backlogs, tax or other law changes, SEC actions, other regulatory actions, expropriation by foreign
governments, lawsuits or legal actions, competition issues, and involuntary accounting changes. Again,
consistent with our conjecture that managers increased forecast quality during the 1990s (e.g., increased
the tendency to explain forecasts with external attributions), a significant difference exists (p < 0.0001)
between the tendency to issue external attributions in the two periods.   The 1993-1996 period has a
higher percentage of forecasts accompanied by external attributions (56.5%) relative to 1983-1986
(46.6%) .
For descriptive purposes, we also provide the distribution of internal attributions for the two
periods.  It is interesting to note that the incidence of internal attributions is nearly identical in the two
periods (38.8% and 39.2%, p = 0.8419).  Because Baginski et al. (2004) document pricing effects of
external but not internal attributions, this result is also consistent with the idea that changes occur in the
set of 1990s management forecast characteristics that are linked to higher quality forecasts.
In Table 2, Panel A, we again examine whether earnings forecast precision increased in the
1990s, controlling for cross-sectional determinants of forecast precision documented by Baginski and
Hassell (1997).  We estimate the following model using logistic regression:
i 0 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i 5 i 6 i i  PRECISE  = ô  + ô  DAYS  + ô  RABSUE  + ô  SIGNUE  + ô  LANAL  + ô  RSIZE  + ô  SHIFT  + å      (1)
9iDAYS  is the number of calendar days that the management earnings forecast precedes period-
1end.  Shorter forecast horizons should yield more precise forecasts.  Accordingly, we expect the ô  < 0. 
iRABSUE  is the ranked absolute value of unexpected earnings (UEMF) conveyed in the
management forecast, computed as follows:
i i i i iUEMF  = [MF  - (AF  or RW )] / Price
i iwhere MF  = the management forecast of EPS for firm i; AF  = the median analyst forecast of EPS for
ifirm i obtained from I/B/E/S for the month preceding the management forecast; RW  = the random walk
forecast (seasonal random walk forecast) of EPS for firm i for annual (interim) management forecasts;
iand Price  = day -2 security price for firm i. Forecasted earnings are explicit for point management
forecasts.  For range forecasts, we used the midpoint of the range; for minimum and maximum type
iforecasts, we used the disclosed lower or upper bound. RABSUE  is a proxy for the variability of expected
2 iearnings, which we expect to be inversely related to forecast precision (ô  < 0). SIGNUE  equals one if
iUEMF  $ 0, and zero otherwise.  Prior research documents that bad news tends to be released in
3imprecise form (e.g., Skinner 1984).  Accordingly, we expect ô  > 0. LANAL is the log of the number of
financial analysts following the firm prior to the month of the management forecast to proxy for firm-
specific differences in the demand for more precise information, which should increase management
4 iearnings forecast precision (ô  > 0).  RSIZE  is a proxy for the predisclosure information environment,
measured as equity market value at the beginning of the year.  To control for the likely effects of inflation
over a nearly 13-year period, we rank the size of the firm within each 4-year period and standardize the
ranks by the number of observations within each 4-year period, yielding a variable between zero and one. 
iLarger values of RSIZE  indicate greater amounts of predisclosure information about a firm, and thus, less
ability of a precise forecast to move security prices.  Consistent with Baginski and Hassell (1997), we
5expect ô  < 0.
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We test our conjecture of an increase in management earnings forecast precision by examining
ithe coefficient on SHIFT  , which equals one in 1993-1996 and zero in 1983-1986.  We expect that
6managers chose to release more precise earnings forecasts in 1993-1996 (i.e., ô  > 0).  Although our
conjecture is based on the idea that a market-wide increase in analyst coverage is one of the driving
forces behind the increase in management earnings forecast precision, we include the number of analysts
following the firms as one of the control variables, thus rendering the regression a conservative test of
our conjecture.  We also estimate our model for firms followed by analysts and those that are not. 
(LANAL is omitted from the model when examining firms not followed by analysts.)  If analyst following
identifies the set of firms for which the information environment changed, then we would expect higher
precision for firms followed by analysts but not for firms not followed.
The results from estimating equation (1) are presented in Table 2, Panel A.  Full sample results
are consistent with our conjecture.  The coefficient on SHIFT is reliably positive (p = 0.0118), indicating
that 1993-1996 management earnings forecasts are more precise than 1983-1986 management earnings
forecasts.  As expected, this result holds for the subsample of analyst followed firms (p = 0.0002), but not
for the subsample of firms not followed by analysts (p = 0.4571).  Results on the control variables are
generally consistent with prior research, which was limited to analyst followed firms in the 1980s
(Baginski and Hassell 1997).  Interestingly, for firms not followed, the forecast horizon variable (DAYS)
is the only significant explanatory variable for forecast precision (p = 0.0001).
For analogous reasons, we also estimate the following model to control for documented
determinants of the tendency to explain a management earnings forecast with an external attribution:
i 0 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i i   EXTERNAL  = ô  + ô  RSIZE  + ô  RABSUE  + ô  SIGNUE  + ô  SHIFT  + å  (2)
In exploratory tests, Baginski et al. (2004) find that external attributions are related to firm size,
the absolute value of unexpected earnings, and the sign of unexpected earnings, each of which are not
11
  External attributions are also issued with maximum type forecasts.  However, forecast form is a7
management choice variable for which we do not wish to control.  Nonetheless, we included an indicator variable for
maximum type forecasts in an untabulated estimation of equation (2).  It is significantly positive, as expected, but the
conclusion about increased external attribution in the 1990's was unaffected.
 As noted previously, when we discard 1996 forecasts, are results our unaffected.  The lone exception is8
that discarding 1996 forecasts yields a much weaker significance level on the SHIFT coefficient in the results for the
subsample not followed by financial analysts (p = 0.092).  As a result, the SHIFT coefficient in the analyst followed
subsample is larger than the SHIFT coefficient in the not followed sample, as expected, with a much higher
reliability (p = 0.0025).
disclosure choices by management.   The results of estimating equation (2) are reported in Table 2, Panel7
B.  Consistent with the exploratory nature of prior research, we do not predict signs on the control
variables.  Our primary conjecture is that more external attributions are made in the 1990s, which is
indicated by a positive coefficient on SHIFT.
For the full sample, results indicate that more attributions are provided by larger firms (p =
0.0212), firms with smaller ranked absolute unexpected earnings in the management forecast (p =
0.1058), and bad news as evidenced by a negative unexpected earnings conveyed in the management
forecast (p = 0.0010).  After controlling for these non-choice variables which have been shown to be
associated with the tendency to explain with external attributions, the coefficient on SHIFT is reliably
positive (p = 0.0001).  The results on the SHIFT variable exist in the analyst followed subsample (p =
0.0008), but also unexpectedly in the subsample of firms not followed by analysts (p = 0.0351).  A t-test
on the difference between the coefficients in the two subsamples (not tabulated) indicates that the
coefficient on SHIFT in the analyst followed sample is greater than the coefficient on SHIFT for firms
not followed.  However, the p-value does not indicate a great degree of reliability (p = .0835 in a one-
tailed test).8
Differences in ex post management earnings forecast characteristics: Accuracy
One would also expect higher quality management earnings forecasts to be more accurate. 
Accordingly, we examine whether management earnings forecast accuracy increased in the 1990s and
12
  An exception is found in the annual management forecasts with no analyst coverage.  The accuracy9
advantage of managers is higher in 1993 - 1996 relative to 1983 - 1986.
whether the increase in forecast accuracy kept pace with benchmark accuracy (financial analysts
forecasts and mechanical forecasts).  We achieve control over firm, time, horizon, and expectation model
effects on accuracy by 1) comparing management earnings forecast accuracy to a benchmark that is firm
and time-period specific; 2) replicating all tests within forecast horizon (annual/interim); and 3)
replicating all tests for followed and unfollowed firms. Therefore, use no other control variables in the
analysis.
Table 3 presents accuracy data for each subperiod across various partitions on forecast horizon
and analyst following.  The first column of data lists the absolute management forecast error:
i i i i MFACC  = *MF  - Actual EPS  )* / Price  (3)
The second column lists absolute benchmark forecast error:
i i i i iBENCHACC  = *(AF  or RW ) - Actual EPS * / Price (4)
which represents the absolute value of the error in the consensus financial analyst forecast (random walk
forecast) if the company is followed (not followed) by I/B/E/S analysts prior to the management forecast. 
The difference between the two columns is the relative management forecast error:
i i iRELATIVEACC  = MFACC  - BENCHACC  (5)
Consistent with prior research, the far right column of Table 3 shows statistically significant
negative values for the relative absolute management forecast error within each subperiod.  Negative
values indicate that the absolute management forecast error was smaller than the absolute benchmark
forecast error (i.e., the management forecast was more accurate than the benchmark).  This result holds
regardless of the data partition.  The third column reports the relative absolute error.  The management
forecasting accuracy advantage is no different in the 1990s relative to the 1980s (i.e., the “difference” is
insignificantly different from zero) in three of the four subsamples.  9
13
  Using raw unexpected earnings truncated at 100% of security price yields similar results, but slightly10
lower explanatory power.
Although financial analyst accuracy improved for both interim and annual forecasts in the 1993-
1996 period, management accuracy also improved so that managers remained more accurate than
financial analysts.  Interpreting the accuracy results in isolation is somewhat dangerous given that
managers might also control the actual earnings number through earnings management.  However,
combined with our finding of increased management earnings forecast precision and tendency to issue
external attributions in the 1990s, the results in Table 3 point to higher quality management earnings
forecasts during that period.
Differences in management earnings forecast consequence: Information content
Our findings so far create the expectation that management earnings forecast information content 
increased in the 1990s as well.  Accordingly, we compare the statistical association of security prices and
unexpected earnings between the two non-overlapping four-year periods. We measured security price
reaction to the management earnings forecast over a three-day event day interval centered on the DJNRS
date (day 0).  We estimate market model parameters over a 200-day period ending 31 trading days before
the management forecast using an equally-weighted market return.  The three-day price reaction is the
cumulative abnormal return (CAR), defined as actual return on each day minus the expected return given
by applying the previously estimated market model parameters to the actual market return.   
Ajinkya and Gift (1984), Waymire (1984), and many others document a positive association
between the unexpected earnings conveyed in a management forecast and cumulative abnormal returns.
In our statistical tests, we use ranked unexpected earnings (RankUE) because Cheng, Hopwood, and
McKeown (1992) document the improvement in explanatory power from using the rank transformation
on unexpected earnings.  10
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Table 4 shows the distributions of CAR and UEMF in the two periods.  Mean and median CAR
are slightly more negative in 1993-1996 (p < 0.001 and p = 0.0046, respectively), although mean and
median UEMF are slightly more positive in 1993-1996 (only the difference in median is significant at a
conventional level, p = 0.0022).  
To test for increased management earnings forecast information content over time, we estimate
the following ordinary least squares model in the cross-section:
i 0 1 i 2 i 3 i iCAR  = ô  + ô  RankUE  + ô  SHIFT  + ô  SHIFT*RankUE  + å  (6)
where SHIFT equals one in 1993-1996 and zero in 1983-1986. The more recent sample period has a far
higher percentage of interim forecasts relative to annual forecasts (p < 0.0001, results not tabulated). 
Also, consistent with arguments in Brown and Caylor (2005), the number of firms followed by financial
analysts also increased dramatically between the two periods (p < 0.0001, results not tabulated). 
Accordingly, we estimate equation (6) separately both for interim and annual forecasts and for analyst
followed and not followed firms.
Table 5 presents results of estimating equation (6).  Our primary interest is in the coefficients on
SHIFT and SHIFT*RankUE.  They measure the extent to which the price reaction to management
earnings forecasts in 1993-1996 differs from the price reaction to management earnings forecasts in the
prior period (1983-1986).  The first entries in Panel A of  the table are the regression results for the full
sample of 2,437 forecasts.  The coefficient on RankUE is significantly positive, as expected (p = 0.0001),
indicating a positive ordinal relationship between unexpected earnings in the management forecast and
cumulative abnormal returns in the forecast period.  The intercept is significantly negative (p = 0.0001).
The intercept shift (SHIFT) is significantly negative (p = 0.0001), indicating that the 1990s price
reactions are more negative, earnings held constant.  The slope shift (SHIFT*RankUE) is significantly
positive (p = 0.0001), indicating that the price reaction per dollar of unexpected earnings is greater in the
1990s.  
15
  Management earnings forecasts are highly dispersed in event time.  Therefore, the potential dependency11
in regression residuals is minimized.  An exception to this event time dispersion occurs because we treat two
forecasts issued at the same time as two separate observations (unexpected earnings conveyed in the forecast and
forecast form can be different for the two forecasts). The most prevalent case is a fourth quarter forecast and an
annual forecast in the same article, which occurs approximately 10% of the time.  Splitting the sample into annual
forecasts and interim forecasts also serves as a robustness check with respect to this residual dependency.
We expect that any increase in the relevance of management earnings forecasts in the 1990s
should be limited to the set of firms followed by financial analysts.  When we split the sample into the
1,381 management forecasts preceded by an I/B/E/S financial analyst forecasts (Analyst followed) and
the 1,056 management forecasts for which an I/B/E/S financial analyst forecast was not available (Not
followed), the results documented in Panel A for the full sample only hold in the sample of analyst
followed firms, as predicted (p = 0.0001 on each shift variable).  Also, results on the set of firms not
followed by financial analysts speak to the question of change in management earnings forecast
relevance over time for firms for which the information environment did not change.  Note that, for firms
not followed, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of equal management earnings forecast
relevance over time.  The coefficients on the shift variables are insignificant (p = 0.8390 and 0.5527).
Panels B and C in Table 3 replicate Panel A for annual forecasts (n = 1,243) and interim
forecasts (n = 1,194) considered separately.  Note that the results are invariant to whether the forecast
relates to an annual or interim period.   Capital market reactions to management earnings forecasts are11
magnified for both annual and interim forecasts in the 1993-1996 period (i.e., coefficients on both SHIFT
and SHIFT*RankUE are significant).  Again, the results for the shift variables hold only in the annual and
interim samples followed by financial analysts.
Information content robustness checks
We performed four sets of supplemental tests to ensure the robustness of our results on the
information content tests.  First, we retain imprecise forecasts in our sample because they are
16
representative of the typical management forecast, and forecast form is associated with forecast news
(e.g., Skinner 1994). A cost of this approach is the potential measurement error in unexpected earnings
conveyed in the management forecast.  Accordingly, we re-ran equation (6) two additional times in
which we used alternative approaches to computing unexpected earnings conveyed in the management
forecasts.  First, in order to abstract from magnitudes of unexpected earnings, we replaced RankUE with
a variable equal to one if UE was greater than or equal to zero, and zero otherwise, and we interacted
SHIFT with this new “sign-only” variable.  The results (not tabulated) yield identical conclusions with
respect to our conjecture.  Adjusted R s decrease slightly, indicating that removal of measurement error2
is more than offset by the loss of information from discarding the magnitudes of unexpected earnings
captured by the ordinal ranking of UE.
Second, we discarded ambiguous management earnings forecast news where, as defined in
Baginski, Hassell, and Waymire (1994), ambiguous good news disclosures include range estimates where
the midpoint exceeds expected earnings but the lower bound is below expected earnings, and minimum
estimates less than or equal to expected earnings; and ambiguous bad news disclosures include range
estimates where the midpoint is less than expected earnings but the upper bound exceeds expected
earnings, and maximum estimates where the upper bound is greater than or equal to expected earnings. 
Again, our results (not tabulated) are robust to this alternative specification.
Third, several studies (e.g. Easton and Zmijewski 1989; Collins and Kothari 1989) document that
firm-specific earnings response coefficients vary both intertemporally and in the cross-section as a
function of economy-wide (i.e., interest rate) and firm-specific (i.e., risk and growth) variables. 
Therefore, we have the potential for a correlated omitted variables problem if we do not control for these
other determinants of earnings response coefficients, and they are correlated with the shift between our
two calendar-based sub-samples.  
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  Changing the deflator from price to earnings creates a new set of problems (e.g., negative earnings,12
outliers, distributional properties of unexpected earnings, etc.).  We use various truncation schemes, windsorization,
and ranking to make sure that our conclusions based on the alternative deflator are robust.  We also took another
approach to controlling for expected capitalization differences across firms in which we maintained the original price
deflator for unexpected earnings and added an additional slope shift variable, the product of the leading earnings to
price ratio and unexpected earnings conveyed in the management forecast (UEMF).  The coefficient estimate on the
variable was significantly negative, as expected, indicating that price response to the unexpected earnings is lower
We believe that our design substantially mitigates any concern about these capitalization factor-
related omitted variables that are associated with earnings response coefficients.  Managers self-select
into our sample in each of the two periods.  Management forecasts are issued by the largest and least
risky firms (Cox 1985; Waymire 1985) with the lowest proprietary information, often proxied by growth
opportunities (Bamber and Cheon 1998) and industry membership (Baginski et al. 2004).  Because (1)
our earnings response coefficient estimation is sample-wide rather than firm-specific, (2) the larger, less
risky, lower growth opportunity firms have self-selected into the sample, and (3) no evidence exists that
the self-selection process on size, risk, and growth varies intertemporally, it is unlikely that correlated
omitted variables are a problem.  Also, if differences in period-specific, economy-wide capitalization
rates are driving our results, we would see significant regime shift variables in the sample of firms not
followed by financial analysts (which we do not).
Nevertheless, we re-estimated equation (6) with additional controls for cross-sectional
differences in expected earnings capitalization rates.  We changed the unexpected earnings deflator by
deflating by prior expected earnings rather than by security price.  Collins and Kothari (1989) argue that
this alternative deflation should yield earnings response coefficients that are less sensitive to the
aforementioned cross-sectional and intertemporal determinants.  Replacing price with earnings as a
deflator is the same as adjusting the management forecast by the price to earnings ratio, which is a
function of interest rates, risk factors, size, and growth, and which essentially captures the effects of
these variables on the extent to which earnings are capitalized into price.  Our conclusions are unaffected
by the results of this alternative specification (results not tabulated).12
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when capitalization rates are lower (i.e., earnings to prices is a smaller number) or insignificant.  However, our
conclusions on the shift variables in equation (6) were unaffected (results not tabulated).
Fourth, Brown and Kim (1991) use stock price association tests to document that the most recent
I/B/E/S analyst forecasts are a better proxy for market expectations than the consensus forecast.  We use
the consensus (i.e., median) I/B/E/S Summary forecast in our main tests rather than the most recent
forecasts.  In effect, we are assuming that the measurement error in using the consensus forecast as a
proxy for market expectations in 1983-1986 is equal to the measurement error in using the consensus
forecast in 1993-1996.  
A fair test of whether measurement error has changed over time is difficult to construct.  January
1, 1993 marks the approximate date on which I/B/E/S began to update analysts’ forecasts on a daily
basis, rather than on weekly or monthly basis as had been done in the past (Cooper, Day, and Lewis
2001).  Therefore, the timeliness of the most recent forecast is likely to differ between our two sample
periods, and using the most recent forecasts might bias our tests in favor of the expected increase in
management forecast information content post-1992.  Using the consensus forecast rather than the most
recent forecasts is likely to mitigate the effects of this change in I/B/E/S updating policy on our tests. 
Rather than attempt to identify most recent forecasts under a changing forecast updating regime,
we conducted two indirect tests to address the potential effects of different forecast timing within the
I/B/E/S Summary file consensus forecast.  First, we repeated our main tests with an additional interaction
variable between the slope shift variable on ranked unexpected earnings (SHIFT*RankUE) and the ratio
of the analyst forecast standard deviation to the median consensus analyst forecast.  Because this ratio is
derived from the I/B/E/S Summary file, it is a noisy measure of the precision of analysts’ forecasts, with
the noise coming from the fact that some forecasts are potentially stale (Brown and Han 1992).  The new
interaction variable captures the joint effect of prior forecast precision and the existence of stale forecasts
on the extent to which the change in sample period affects the price/earnings relation.  The coefficient
19
  Finally, Bradshaw (2003) provides a graph of the relation between EPS determined under GAAP and13
EPS as reported by I/B/E/S.  These two variables closely align in 1983-1986, and they clearly diverge in 1993-1996. 
If post-1992 I/B/E/S analysts are forecasting and providing actuals based on what they believe are more value
relevant numbers than provided by GAAP,  then one would expect less measurement error in the expectation model
post-1992.  However, management forecasts issued post-1992 included rare references to special items, and it is not
clear what earnings construct they are forecasting and whether that construct has changed over time.  To test whether
management forecasts have changed like analyst forecasts have over time, future research can consider whether pro
forma earnings released by managers more closely align with management forecasts in more recent periods. 
estimate on the interaction is significantly positive (results not tabulated) indicating that the stronger post
1992 pricing effects of management earnings forecasts are greater when the analyst forecast standard
deviation is higher prior to the forecast.  Most important to our study, the t-statistic on the primary slope
shift variable on ranked unexpected earnings (SHIFT*RankUE) remains unchanged.
In our second indirect test, we divide the full sample into quartiles based on the number of days
between the management earnings forecast and period end, and we repeat our main tests on each of the
four samples.  The age of any analyst forecast included in the consensus is minimized for long horizon
management forecasts, and the likelihood of out-of-date forecasts is also minimized.  We document that
the coefficient on our main research variable (SHIFT*RankUE) is significant in each quartile (results not
tabulated).  Most importantly, the coefficients and t-statistics on the main research variable in quartiles
one and four are very similar.  Thus, it is unlikely that our results are significantly affected by the use of
I/B/E/S Summary data.13
5. Summary, limitations, and conclusions
We compare cross-sectional average management earnings forecast characteristics in one four-
year period beginning in 1993 and ending in 1996 to management earnings forecast characteristics
occurring in a comparison period 10 years earlier (1983-1986). Given the dramatic change in the macro
information environment in the 1990s, driven by greater institutional investor demand for forward-
looking information and satisfied by more precise, accurate, and influential analysts reports, we expect
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managers to respond to the higher information quality hurdle if they wish to align investor expectations
with their own.  Accordingly, we expect managers to release 1990s management earnings forecasts that
possess characteristics indicative of higher quality – increased precision, increased accuracy, and
increased explanation. 
Using a sample of 2,437 management earnings forecasts, we document an increase in
management forecast precision, forecast accuracy, and the tendency to explain forecasts with external
attributions in 1993-1996 relative to 1983-1986.  Given that these forecast characteristics are linked to
increased information content, we also document that the information content of management forecasts
increased during the period, and that the increases occur only for firms covered by financial analysts, as
expected.
A potential limitation of our study, common to all intertemporal work, is the existence of
unidentified variables which are correlated with the passage of time and that explain increases in the
dependent variable (in our case, precision, accuracy, external attribution, and information content).  An
element of our design that mitigates the potential impact of this limitation is our finding that management
earnings forecast quality variables increase during the 1990s only for subsamples for which plausible
explanations suggest such an increase.  For example, management forecast precision does not increase in
the 1990s for firms not followed by financial analysts.  Another potential limitation of our study is the
need to create large hand-gathered samples or to use existing samples that do not cover all periods of
time.  In this study, we do not use data from 1987-1992, and therefore we are unable to infer management
earnings forecast quality during that time period.  Additionally, management earnings forecasting is
sufficiently sporadic to impede construction of powerful interrupted time-series tests on changes in firm-
specific management forecasting behavior.  As a result, we have to rely on cross-sectional tests with non-
management choice firm-specific control variables in many of our tests.  Finally, the coding of qualitative
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data raises the potential for noise. Fortunately, our tests are sufficiently powerful to reject the statistical
null hypotheses associated with our conjectures.
In a sample ending in 1998, Landsman and Maydew (2002) document that earnings releases (a
management disclosure) have increased in quality in recent times.  In a sample spanning 1986-1995,
Francis et al. (2002a) document that analysts reports (a disclosure by information intermediaries) have
increased in quality in recent times. We document that management earnings forecast quality has also
increased in 1993-1996 relative to 1983-1996 by documenting both increases in ex ante determinants of
usefulness (precision, accuracy, and explanation) and ex post realization of the expected usefulness
(increased information content).   Our findings are unique in that management earnings forecasts are also
management disclosures, but unlike earnings releases, are unaudited, voluntary disclosures.  
Our findings also relate to the work in Francis et al. (2000b) who attribute the increased
information content of earnings releases to accompanying supplemental information. We document a
similar increase in the information content of management earnings forecasts, which we attribute to the
greater degree of precision and explanation associated with such forecasts. We find that information
production to yield both more precision and more explanation in management forecast has also increased
over time, and the resulting information content of management earnings forecasts has increased.
Additional research is necessary to more fully understand why several studies document a
decline in earnings relevance when earnings disclosures appear to possess increased information content
regardless of source (management or analyst), verification (audited or unaudited), mandate (voluntary or
required), and focus (historical or forward-looking).  Also, the presence of higher quality management
forecasts adds an additional dimension to the interaction and possible substitution between competing
information sources.
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TABLE 1
Univariate Differences Between Periods in Management Earnings Forecast Precision and Attributions Issued with
Management Earnings Forecasts
                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                    1983 - 1986                   1993 - 1996
Variable                                                                                Observations (%)           Observations (%)      
PRECISE
Maximum (PRECISE = 0) 274   (18.4) 136   (14.3)
Minimum (PRECISE = 0) 563   (37.9) 290   (30.5)
Range (PRECISE = 1) 283   (19.0) 270   (28.4)
Point (PRECISE =2)               366   (24.6)       255   (26.8)
Total            1,486 (100.0) 951 (100.0)
÷  = 38.28 (p < 0.0001)2
EXTERNAL
External attribution provided (EXTERNAL = 1) 692   (46.6) 537   (56.5)
No external attribution (EXTERNAL = 0)               794   (53.4)       414   (43.5)
Total            1,486 (100.0) 951 (100.0)
÷  = 22.73 (p < 0.0001)2
INTERNAL
Internal attribution provided (INTERNAL = 1) 542   (38.8) 409   (39.2)
No internal attribution (INTERNAL = 0)               853   (61.2)       633   (60.8)
Total            1,395 (100.0) 951 (100.0)
÷  = 0.04 (p =0.8419)2
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TABLE 2
Intertemporal Changes in the Management Earnings Forecast Imprecision and Tendency to Provide External
Attributions 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
i 0 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i 5 i 6 i i Model:  PRECISE  = ô  + ô  DAYS  + ô  RABSUE  + ô  SIGNUE  + ô  LANAL  + ô  RSIZE  + ô  SHIFT  + å  
(Note: LANAL is omitted from the model when examining firms not followed by analysts.)
PANEL A Full sample (n = 2,437) Analyst followed  (n = 1,381) Not followed (n = 1,056)
Predicted
sign
Coefficient
estimate p-value
Coefficient
estimate p-value
Coefficient
estimate p-value
DAYS - -0.002 0.0001 -0.002 0.0001 -0.002 0.0001
RABSUE -  0.001 0.9991 -0.001 0.0052 0.002 0.9991
SIGNUE +  0.208 0.0047 0.573 0.0001 -0.085 0.7414
LANAL +  0.098 0.0106 0.302 0.0014 N/A N/A
RSIZE - -0.250 0.0580 -1.564 0.0002 -0.085 0.4444
SHIFT +  0.189 0.0118 0.458 0.0002 0.016 0.4571
Model ÷ 71.77 0.0001 72.35 0.0001 72.36 0.00012
i 0 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i i Model:   EXTERNAL  = ô  + ô  RSIZE  + ô  RABSUE  + ô  SIGNUE  + ô  SHIFT  + å  
PANEL B Full sample (n = 2,437) Analyst followed  (n = 1,381) Not followed (n = 1,056)
Predicted
sign
Coefficient
estimate p-value
Coefficient
estimate p-value
Coefficient
estimate p-value
RSIZE none  0.330 0.0212 0.533 0.0887 0.252 0.5825
RABSUE none -0.001 0.1058 -0.000 0.4566 -0.001 0.0318
SIGNUE none -0.274 0.0010 -0.154 0.1609 -0.452 0.0009
SHIFT +  0.402 0.0001 0.371 0.0008 0.281 0.0351
Model ÷ 41.15 0.0001 21.52 0.0002 15.80 0.00172
p-values are one-tailed when a sign is predicted.
PRECISE equals two for the most precise point forecasts, one for range forecasts, and zero for open-interval
minimum and maximum type forecasts.  
EXTERNAL equals one if the explanation for forecasted performance relates to an external factor, and zero
otherwise.  
iDAYS  is the number of calendar days that the management earnings forecast precedes period-end.  
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iRABSUE  is the ranked absolute value of unexpected earnings (UEMF) conveyed in the management forecast,
i i i i i i icomputed as UEMF  = [MF  - (AF  or RW )] / Price  , where MF  = the management forecast of EPS for firm i; AF  =
the median analyst forecast of EPS for firm i obtained from I/B/E/S for the month preceding the management
iforecast; RW  = the random walk forecast (seasonal random walk forecast) of EPS for firm i for annual (interim)
imanagement forecasts; and Price  = day -2 security price for firm i. Forecasted earnings are explicit for point
management forecasts.  For range forecasts, we used the midpoint of the range; for minimum and maximum type
forecasts, we used the disclosed lower or upper bound.
i iSIGNUE  equals one if UEMF  $ 0, and zero otherwise. 
LANAL is the log of the number of financial analysts following the firm (plus one) prior to the month of the
management forecast.
iRSIZE  is the ranked (within each four-year period) equity market value at the beginning of the year, standardized by 
the number of observations within each 4-year period, yielding a variable between zero and one.  
iSHIFT  equals one in 1993-1996 and zero in 1983-1986. 
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TABLE 3
Benchmark and Management Forecast Accuracy in Each Period
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Sample
Absolute
management
forecast error
Absolute
benchmark
forecast error
Relative absolute
management
forecast error
Interim forecasts, Followed by analysts 
   1993 - 1996 (n = 400) 0.012 0.016 -0.004***
   1983 - 1986 (n = 159) 0.027 0.035 -0.008***
   Difference  -0.015*** -0.019** 0.004a
Interim forecasts, Not followed by
analysts
   1993 - 1996 (n = 169) 0.025 0.031 -0.006***
   1983 - 1986 (n = 466) 0.016 0.028 -0.012***
   Difference 0.009*** 0.003*** 0.006a
Annual forecasts, Followed by analysts
   1993 - 1996 (n = 291) 0.040 0.045 -0.005***
   1983 - 1986 (n = 531) 0.063 0.078 -0.015***
    Difference -0.023*** -0.033* 0.010a
Annual forecasts, Not followed by analysts
  1993 - 1996 (n = 91) 0.048 0.114 -0.066***
  1983 - 1986 (n = 330) 0.059 0.076 -0.017***b
 Difference -0.011** 0.039*** -0.049**a
  *** (**, *) significant at p = 0.01 (0.05, 0.10) in two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test (signed rank test on relativea
management forecast error within subperiod).
Influenced by a large positive outlier.  When removed, the value is less than 0.048, and the “difference” is positive. b 
The Wilcoxon rank-sum test indicates that management forecast accuracy declined from 1983-1986 to 1993-1996.
i i i iAbsolute management forecast error:  MFACC  = *MF  - Actual EPS  )* / Price  
i i i i iAbsolute benchmark forecast error:  BENCHACC  = *(AF  or RW ) - Actual EPS * / Price
i i iRelative management forecast error:  RELATIVEACC  = MFACC  - BENCHACC  
i iMF  = the management forecast of EPS for firm i; AF  = the median analyst forecast of EPS for firm i obtained from
iI/B/E/S for the month preceding the management forecast; RW  = the random walk forecast (seasonal random walk
iforecast) of EPS for firm i for annual (interim) management forecasts; and Price  = day -2 security price for firm i. 
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TABLE 4
Variable Distributions for Management Forecast Information Content Tests 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
         Standard             Lower                                             Upper         
Variable                        N               Mean              Deviation           Quartile             Median               Quartile        
CAR
1983-1986 1,486 -0.010 0.066 -0.033 -0.004 0.021
1993-1996 951 -0.028 0.114 -0.069 -0.009 0.029
t-statistic on difference in means = 4.43 (p < 0.001)
Wilcoxon rank-sum test = 2.84 (p = 0.0046)  
UEMF
1983-1986 1,486 0.007 0.104 -0.008 0.000 0.010
1993-1996 951 0.012 0.086 -0.005 0.001 0.012
t-statistic on difference in means = -1.37 (p = 0.1710)
Wilcoxon rank-sum test = -3.06 (p = 0.0022)    
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
i i i i i i iUEMF  = [MF  - (AF  or RW )] / Price  , where MF  = the management forecast of EPS for firm i; AF  = the median
ianalyst forecast of EPS for firm i obtained from I/B/E/S for the month preceding the management forecast; RW  = the
random walk forecast (seasonal random walk forecast) of EPS for firm i for annual (interim) management forecasts;
iand Price  = day -2 security price for firm i. CAR = the security price reaction to the management forecast over a
three-day event day interval centered on the DJNRS date (day 0) using standard market model estimation techniques.
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TABLE 5
Intertemporal Changes in the Information Content of Management Earnings Forecasts 
                                                                                                                                                                                                              
PANEL A Full sample (n = 2,437) Analyst followed  (n = 1,381) Not followed (n = 1,056)
Predicted
sign
Coefficient
estimate p-value
Coefficient
estimate p-value
Coefficient
estimate p-value
Intercept none -0.032 0.0001 -0.024 0.0001 -0.042 0.0001
RankUE + 0.019 0.0001 0.013 0.0014 0.026 0.0001
SHIFT none -0.053 0.0001 -0.073 0.0001 -0.003 0.8390
SHIFT*RankUE + 0.026 0.0001 0.038 0.0001 -0.001 0.5527
Model F-statistic 60.93 0.0001 49.21 0.0001 14.55 0.0001
Adjusted R 0.0687 0.0949 0.03712
PANEL B
Annual
Forecasts
Annual forecasts
(n = 1,243)
Annual forecasts with analyst
following (n = 822)
Annual forecasts without
analyst following (n =
421) 
Intercept none -0.020 0.0001 -0.017 0.0014 -0.027 0.0092
RankUE + 0.009 0.0025 0.009 0.0091 0.011 0.0422
SHIFT none -0.039 0.0001 -0.046 0.0001 -0.013 0.6188
SHIFT*RankUE + 0.021 0.0004 0.022 0.0005 0.013 0.1847
Model F-statistic 15.61 0.0001 16.31 0.0001 2.72 0.0440
Adjusted R 0.0341 0.0503 0.01222
PANEL C
Interim
Forecasts
Interim forecasts
(n = 1,194) 
Interim forecasts with analyst
following (n = 559)  
Interim forecasts, without
analyst following ( n =
635)
Intercept none -0.058 0.0001 -0.056 0.0006 -0.058 0.0001
RankUE + 0.040 0.0001 0.032 0.0074 0.042 0.0001
SHIFT none -0.047 0.0001 -0.075 0.0002 0.041 0.3836
SHIFT*RankUE + 0.018 0.0196 0.043 0.0032 -0.019 0.9604
Model F-statistic 48.75 0.0001 27.50 0.0001 17.81 0.0001
Adjusted R 0.1072 0.1247 0.07372
p-values are one-tailed when a sign is predicted.
i 0 1 i 2 i 3 i iModel CAR  = ô  + ô  RankUE  + ô  SHIFT  + ô  SHIFT*RankUE  + å  
i i i i i i iRankUE  = Rank [MF  - (AF  or RW )] / Price  , where MF  = the management forecast of EPS for firm i; AF  = the median analyst
iforecast of EPS for firm i obtained from I/B/E/S for the month preceding the management forecast; RW  = the random walk
iforecast (seasonal random walk forecast) of EPS for firm i for annual (interim) management forecasts; and Price  = day -2
security price for firm i. CAR = the security price reaction to the management forecast over a three-day event day interval
centered on the DJNRS date (day 0) using standard market model estimation techniques. SHIFT = 1 (0) for the 1993-1996 (1983-
1986) period. Coefficients on ranked variables are multiplied by 10,000.
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